The padlock in the address bar and the letters https at the start of an address are familiar to everyone, but not everyone understands what exactly they protect. Below: what HTTPS is per the standards, what it closes off from your provider and the Wi-Fi owner, what stays visible and how that differs from a VPN’s protection.
In short. HTTPS is ordinary HTTP inside a protected TLS connection: per RFC 9110 it must provide confidentiality and integrity, and the server must be authenticated. Page contents, passwords and messages are not visible to someone on the path: per RFC 8446 data sent after the connection is established is visible only to the endpoints. But the site’s name travels in plain text in the connection’s first packet (RFC 8744), and in the DNS query if DNS is not encrypted, and the server’s address is always visible. The newer RFC 9849 encrypts the name in the first packet but hides neither the server’s address nor plain DNS queries. The padlock does not mean an honest site: Chrome’s help asks for caution with personal data even on a secure connection.
We make Mayak, a private network with an Android app. This article is about HTTPS per the standards; on what a foreign network sees we have our own measurement, linked below.
🍎 On iPhone Mayak works with the subscription link from your account. INCY was removed from the Russian App Store on 27 October 2026: if you already have it, it keeps working — do not delete it, it cannot be downloaded again from the Russian store right now. With a Russian Apple account, Clash Mi and Shadowrocket are available now (we have not verified them live with our link); Happ and INCY need an Apple account of another country.
What HTTPS is
HTTPS is HTTP, that is, the ordinary exchange between a browser and a site, but inside a protected connection. RFC 9110 defines it this way: an exchange counts as “secured” if it has confidentiality and integrity protection acceptable to both client and server, and the server has been authenticated as acting on behalf of the identified authority. The client, per the same document, must make sure that requests for an https address are secured before they are sent.
The protection is given by TLS. Version 1.3 is described in RFC 8446: the protocol is “designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery”, and the data sent after the connection is established is visible only to the endpoints, that is, your browser and the server. In the same version all handshake messages after the server’s reply (ServerHello) are encrypted, the certificate included.
What HTTPS closes off
The contents. The page you opened, the password you typed, the letter you sent: all of this goes inside the protected connection and for someone on the path remains a set of encrypted bytes. Chrome’s help puts it in words: on a secure connection, the information you send and get is private between you and the site.
Tampering. The same protected channel does not let an outsider quietly alter what you receive: integrity is one of the properties RFC 9110 requires. Chrome’s help describes the opposite case, sites without protection: on a page labelled “Not secure” someone may be able to view and change the information you send and get, and only the site’s owner can fix this by moving to HTTPS.
What stays visible
Here is the important “but”. TLS protects the contents, not the fact of a connection: the site’s name is needed before the protection switches on. RFC 6066 explains why: TLS has no way for a client to tell the server the name it is contacting, and many “virtual” servers can live at one address, so the client may pass the name in the server_name extension of the first message. RFC 8744 says outright that this element is “transmitted in cleartext” and that as other ways of monitoring get closed, monitoring focuses on the cleartext SNI.
We checked this ourselves: in our measurement of 20 September 2026, without a tunnel, all four of the four requested names were visible both in the queries to the name service and in the first handshake packet; the details and caveats are in the article “Public Wi-Fi: what the owner of the point sees”.
The summary is in the table.
| What | Visible on the path | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Page contents, passwords, messages | No: per RFC 8446, data sent after the connection is established is “only visible to the endpoints” | RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3); Chrome’s help: information “is private between you and the site” |
| The page address and request parameters | Sent inside the protected connection. This is our inference: RFC 9110 says the destination host and port are passed within each HTTP request, and the request travels over the protected connection | RFC 9110 (section 4.3.3), RFC 8446 |
| The site’s name in the DNS query | With ordinary DNS, yes, in plain text; DNS over HTTPS closes this | RFC 8484, Microsoft’s documentation; our article on DNS |
| The site’s name in the connection’s first packet (SNI) | Yes: RFC 8744 calls this element “transmitted in cleartext”. In our measurement of 20 September 2026 the names of all four sites were in the first packet without a tunnel | RFC 8744, RFC 6066 (why the field exists); our article on public Wi-Fi |
| The server’s IP address | Yes: RFC 9849 lists “visible server IP addresses” among what can give away the target even when the name is encrypted | RFC 9849 |
| The size and timing of the exchange | We did not study this in the documents we read | — |
The upshot: what you do on a site is not visible per these documents, while which site you came to is. This is the same conclusion as in our article on public Wi-Fi.
Want a foreign network not to see the names of sites? In our measurement of 20 September 2026, not one name came out of the Mayak tunnel in 29.7 seconds. We do not ask for payment details for the trial. 3 days free once you sign up with your email.
What happens next.
- Create an account in the dashboard: an email and a password, no card needed.
- Install the app: from Google Play or as a file from our site. On the first connection Android shows a connection-request window: that is expected.
- Press one button, wait for “Protected” and open the “My IP” page: sites will see our server’s address, not yours.
🍎 On iPhone Mayak works with the subscription link from your account. INCY was removed from the Russian App Store on 27 October 2026: if you already have it, it keeps working — do not delete it, it cannot be downloaded again from the Russian store right now. With a Russian Apple account, Clash Mi and Shadowrocket are available now (we have not verified them live with our link); Happ and INCY need an Apple account of another country.
A padlock does not mean an honest site
HTTPS answers the question “is the path to this site protected”, not “can this site be trusted”. Chrome’s help (we read the Android version) shows the status in “Site controls” and names the labels “Not secure” and “Dangerous”; at the same time it advises always being careful when you share personal information, even on a secure connection, and checking the site’s name in the address bar. For pages labelled “Not secure” or “Dangerous” the help advises not entering personal information.
So the padlock and https are a condition of decent protection of the path, not a guarantee of who is at the other end. How not to fall for a fake site, we do not cover in this article.
What encrypting the site’s name changes
The weak spot we named, the open field with the name, is what the newer standard RFC 9849, “TLS Encrypted Client Hello”, closes (March 2026, going by the title of the RFC Editor’s page). It encrypts the client’s initial message, and to an observer on the path the site’s name hides among other sites of the same provider: all that is visible is that the client is reaching that provider. The document itself calls the SNI “perhaps the most sensitive information left unencrypted in TLS 1.3”.
The conditions and limits per the text of the standard. A site that wants to use ECH must publish its configuration; it is published through DNS (RFC 9849 refers to RFC 9460 and RFC 9848, the SVCB and HTTPS records). And the standard itself cautions: ECH is “not in itself sufficient to protect the identity of the server”: the target is given away by plain DNS queries and visible server IP addresses. Section 8.2 warns that setups that depend on the SNI (for example, load balancing) may stop working without updates.
Which sites and browsers have already switched ECH on, we did not check. So in practice you cannot count on the name of your site already being hidden in the first packet.
HTTPS and a VPN: whose parts of the protection they are
HTTPS protects the connection between your browser and the site, and a VPN protects the one between your device and the VPN server. These are different stretches. Our article on VPN safety says: with a VPN, the operator or the Wi-Fi owner sees one connection to one server, and the site names are now seen by the service; the service does not see the contents of pages opened over HTTPS. So the visibility does not vanish but moves to whom you entrusted the tunnel.
What Mayak’s measurement shows. On 20 September 2026 we took a dump of our own traffic twice: without a tunnel, a window of 6.1 seconds and 1,101 packets, four names of four in plain text, both in the queries to the name service and in the first handshake packet; from the tunnel, a window of 29.7 seconds and 5,446 packets, not one name in either place, and a single flow to a single address visible. It is one measurement on our working machine, not on a phone in a café; the details are in the article on public Wi-Fi.
What we do not promise
That https makes you anonymous: it closes off the contents, but not the site’s name or the server’s address. That the padlock means an honest site. That your browser and the site you need have already switched on name encryption (ECH). That a VPN makes you invisible: it moves the visibility to the service rather than removing it.
What we checked
- RFC 9110 (section 4.2.2 on https, section 4.3.3), RFC 8446 (abstract, introduction), RFC 6066 (section 3 on server_name), RFC 8744 (the introduction on the SNI) and RFC 9849 (introduction, conditions, limits): read on 21 November 2026; of the large documents we read the beginning (up to 100,000 characters), not the rest.
- Chrome’s help on checking whether a site’s connection is secure (the Android version): 21 November 2026.
- Our articles “Public Wi-Fi: what the owner of the point sees” (a measurement of 20 September 2026), “A safe VPN” and “What a DNS server is”.
What we do not know
- Which sites and browsers switch on name encryption (ECH) today: not checked; the month RFC 9849 was published is taken from the title of the RFC Editor’s page.
- Whether the size and timing of an exchange are visible on the path and what can be learned from them: we did not study this in the documents we read.
- Section 17 (“Security Considerations”) of RFC 9110 and the other parts of the large documents we did not read.
- Chrome’s help for desktop, Firefox and Yandex Browser: the labels there may differ.
- What such a dump looks like on a foreign network in a café: our measurement was made on our own machine.
Short answers
What is HTTPS? HTTP inside a protected TLS connection: per RFC 9110 it gives confidentiality and integrity, and the server is authenticated.
Does my provider see what I do on an https site? Per RFC 8446 the contents are visible only to you and the site. Which site is visible: the name goes in plain text in the first packet (RFC 8744) and in an ordinary DNS query.
What is SNI? A field in the first TLS message where the client names the server it is contacting (RFC 6066); it is transmitted in cleartext (RFC 8744).
What is ECH? The standard RFC 9849, which encrypts the client’s initial message and hides the site’s name; it does not hide the server’s address or plain DNS queries.
Does the padlock mean a site can be trusted? No: Chrome’s help advises caution with personal data even on a secure connection.